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Children as Research Subjects: The Overbroad Regulations in 45 C.F.R. § 46, Subpart D, in 
Conjunction with Legislative Economic Incentives Allow for Exploitation of this Vulnerable 
Subject Population 
 
 
Jacqueline Berg
 
 
After describing and examining the disparity in research conducted on adults with that on 
children and why it exists, this paper will discuss the recent legislative response, will highlight a 
number of the ambiguities and the questionable ethics of the unsatisfying regulations governing 
children as research subjects, and will recommend improvements in striking the delicate balance 
needed to protect children from research abuse and improve their health through useful, careful 
research. 
Why There is a Need for Children to Act as Research Subjects 
Roughly seventy-five percent of drugs approved for use in the United States have never 
been subjected to comprehensive pediatric studies.1 A General Accounting Office (GAO) study 
published in 1991 reports that eighty to ninety percent of pediatric patients are prescribed off-label 
drugs.2 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reports that in 1994 the 10 drugs lacking 
pediatric labeling which were prescribed most often to children, were prescribed over 5 million 
times.3 Albuterol, not labeled for use in children and used for asthma and other respiratory 
problems, was prescribed 1.6 million times in 1994 to children under 12 years old. Such rampant 
prescription of off-label drugs presents vast risk to children’s health. Children are not merely mini-
adults; because of specific physiological differences from adults, children need carefully tailored 
drugs and dosages. As the organs that break down drugs or excrete chemicals take many years to 
mature, children absorb and metabolize medicine more quickly than adults. Also, because the rate 
of blood flow to the skin and lungs is higher in children, topical and inhaled agents may be absorbed 
more rapidly in children than in adults. Consequently, when drugs have not been tested on children, 
doctors are likely to stick to older, less cutting-edge and perhaps less effective treatments for 
                                                 
1 Jerome Groopman, The Pediatric Gap, The New Yorker, 32, 32 (January 10, 2005) 
2 David M. Smolin, Nontherapeutic Research with Children: The Virtues and Vices of Legal Uncertainty, 33 
Cumberland Law Review 629, 621 (2002-2003). 
3 www.fda.gov – general information 
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children, while adults reap the benefit of innovative, tested medicines.4 Further, not only is the lack 
of child-specific pharmaceutical information risky, but although it is legal to use drugs off-label, the 
practice is deceptive because parents will assume that a drug on the market, prescribed by a 
physician, has gone through the rigorous three-phase FDA approval process and has proven safe 
and effective for the recipient. 
Disincentives 
 This “pediatric gap” stems from numerous financial, legal and ethical issues that have 
served as disincentives to employing children as research subjects. To summarize, the financial 
disincentives are that: children are a smaller, less profitable market than adults because they are 
healthier; off-label prescriptions serve to bring in profits without the expense of conducting 
pediatric research; and pediatric studies present additional and substantial liability due to the tolled 
statute of limitations. The legal disincentives were that until the promulgation of Subpart D in 1983, 
the federal regulations providing additional protection for children involved as subjects in research, 
because only an adult can give informed consent, children’s role in research was legally uncertain. 
Ethically, the disincentives to conducting pediatric research remain immense: the validity of the 
child assent and parental permission proxy; defining the value and acceptability of Utilitarianism for 
this “vulnerable” group; delimiting an acceptable level of risk; and addressing rampant conflicts of 
interest within the Institutional Review Boards (IRB), with the referring doctor, and possibly with 
the child’s parent(s). 
 
 
                                                 
4 Groopman at 37. 
 3
Federal Regulations Governing Human Research 
Against the backdrop of a history of ethical violations and abusive practices, from the 
torturous Nazi “experiments” abroad, to incidents such as the Tuskegee Study and the Willowbrook 
School incident in the United States, Congress authorized the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (DHEW) to regulate research on children subjects. The Department created initial 
regulations in 1974, and following the National Commission’s Belmont Report on Human Subject 
Research, in 1981 the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), formerly DHEW, 
promulgated general regulations for the protection of human subjects in 45 C.F.R. § 46. Two years 
later DHHS issued Subpart D of the regulations: additional protections for children involved as 
subjects in research, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-46.409.5 See attached Subpart D. 
Congressional Encouragement of Pediatric Research 
 To combat the deeply entrenched, above-mentioned disincentives to conducting pediatric 
research in order to fill the pediatric gap, Congress recently enacted economic incentives to spur on 
pharmaceutical companies.  The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 
1997 and the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA) of 2002, encourage pediatric research 
by granting a 6-month extension of monopoly privileges if the company provides the FDA with 
adequate pediatric labeling.6 Despite the substantial increase in the number of pediatric studies, one 
figure cites the increase in child participation in industry-funded trials as jumping from 16,000 in 
1997 to 45,000 in 20017, the pediatric gap still exists and the legislation has created numerous 
concerns.  One such concern is the resultant costly delay in the approval of generic drugs. A GAO 
report of 2001 on the issue of pediatric exclusivity stated,  
                                                 
5 Randall Baldwin Clark, Speed, Safety, and Dignity: Pediatric Pharmaceutical Development in an Age of Optimism, 9 
U. Chi. L.Sch. Roundtable 1, 2-3 (2002). 
6 FDAMA, Pub.L. No. 105-115 (1997) and BPCA, Pub. L. No. 107-109 (2002). 
7 Alice Dembner, Teddy Bears and Veiled Threats to Attract Children into Medical Experiments, Researchers 
increasingly Use “Incentives” and Appeal to Parents’ Deepest Fears, Boston Globe, (March 20, 2001). 
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FDA estimates that the delay in availability of generic drugs could increase national 
drug spending by … on average about $695 million per year over a 20-year period.8
  
Further, the Acts are only voluntary and they do not address the issue of old drugs that have never 
been tested on children and for which there is no exclusivity extension incentive. Although the 
Pediatric Research Equity Act9 was passed in 2003, requiring drug companies working on a 
treatment for a disease that affects both adults and children to conduct pediatric studies, it has 
serious loopholes. Particularly, Congress did not set a timetable for the completion of those 
mandatory pediatric studies.  Therefore, because of the 2007 “sunset,” drug companies may push 
their adult-approved drug to market, promise to conduct the child studies, but wait until the 
legislation expires or lapses and never conduct the pediatric studies.  
Along with the increase in pediatric research have come increased numbers of ethical 
violations. According to one reporter, between 1999 and 2001, regulators cited more than three-
dozen hospitals and universities for breaking research rules protecting children.10 Violations of 
Subpart D probably existed prior to the Congressional incentives, but with the increase in pediatric 
research, the legal and ethical uncertainties of Subpart D have become glaring. Contrary to its 
protective purpose, the regulations allow researchers great leeway to conduct perilous, ethically 
sketchy studies in the name of progress.  
Deficiencies of Subpart D, applicable to all Human Research Subjects, Particularly Dangerous in 
Children: Money, Conflicts of Interest and Lack of Oversight 
 
A. Money 
There is nothing in the regulations that governs inducements. The AMA Ethics, however, 
give guidance, stating that researchers are not to receive money for referrals to studies. But doctors 
often profit from referring children to research protocols.  According to the President of the 
                                                 
8 Karena Cooper, Pediatric Marketing Exclusivity as Altered by the Best Pharmaceuticals For Children Act of 2002, 57 
Food & Drug L.J. 519, 528 (2002). 
9 Pediatric Research Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936 (2003) 
10 Dembner at 2 
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Alliance for Human Research Protection, “Physicians commonly earn fees of $2,000 to $5,000 per 
child they refer for clinical trials.”11  Similarly, Subpart D is silent as to whether money can be 
given to child research subjects. A survey by an NIH researcher, however, revealed that about 25% 
of pediatric studies in 1999 advertised some compensation for children or their parents – typically 
$200-$400, but sometimes up to $1,000.12 The problem with unregulated inducements is that they 
may persuade doctors to underestimate risks, making them more apt to recommend children as 
research subjects, and may undermine the objective decision-making process of parents and 
children. 
B. Conflicts of Interest – The IRB, Doctors and Researchers 
 As for regulating conflicts of interest, only the general human subject regulations, not 
specifically Subpart D, address the issue. § 46.107 (e) states, “No IRB may have a member 
participate…in which the member has a conflicting interest…” But there is ample evidence of such 
conflicts. A 2003 Harvard Health Policy Institute survey concluded that, “The fact that almost half 
of all faculty IRB members serve as consultants to industry raises potential conflicts of interest.”13 
Because the IRB plays the crucial role of overseeing the validity of informed consent (with a child, 
his assent and his parent(s)’ permission) and policing the level of risk in a study, those safeguards 
are compromised if and when the IRB members have a personal interest in the research.   
Additionally, there is nothing within Subpart D, or elsewhere in 45 C.F.R. Part 46, which 
requires a special IRB membership for the review of child research. The federal regulations call for 
at least a five-member IRB with a nonscientist and a nonaffiliated member. But in practice, because 
only one member must be a non-scientist, the largely scientist composition of the IRB inevitably 
leads it toward approval of research more than if it were comprised of mostly laymen. Ethicist 
                                                 
11 Vera Sharav, Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research Harm children with and without Disabilities, J. Disability 
Pol’y Stud. 50 (June 2004). 
12 Dembner at 6. 
13 Sharav at 7. 
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George Annas, though he would prefer all community members on the IRB, calls for a 1:2 ratio of 
community members to scientists for its composition. He states,  
The question of what we can do to our fellow human beings in the name of science is 
a public question. And public members are the only people who can really speak to 
that.14
  
While having all laymen decide the ethical issues of human subject research might be useful for 
evaluating the ethics of a protocol, because only scientists or medical doctors can understand and 
begin to predict the physical risks and effects of a scientific experiment, IRBs should remain at least 
equally composed of scientists and laymen.   
When using children as research subjects, aside from having some non-interested, non-
scientific point of reference to evaluate the ethics of the proposed experiment, the IRB should 
contain at least some specifically child-oriented members. The regulations, however, only permit 
for such specialists, but do not require them. §46.107(a) states in part,  
If an IRB regularly reviews research that involves a vulnerable category of subjects, 
such as children…consideration shall be given to the inclusion of one or more 
individuals who are knowledgeable about and experienced in working with these 
subjects. (emphasis added) 
 
 § 46.107(f) states,  
An IRB may, in its discretion, invite individuals with competence in special areas to 
assist in the review of issues which require expertise beyond or in addition to that 
available on the IRB. These individuals may not vote with the IRB. (emphasis added) 
 
To ensure a thorough child-protective review as to the appropriateness of using this vulnerable 
category of subjects in research, Subpart D should specifically mandate that a Pediatrician and/or 
other child specialist review and vote on the inclusion of children in clinical trials. 
Likewise, nothing throughout Part 46 or Subpart D protects the participant from a treating 
doctor’s conflict of interest in research that he is conducting. Thus unbeknownst to a potential 
                                                 
14George Annas, Why we Need a National Human Experimentation Agency. Accountability in Research: Policies and 
Quality Assurance 1999; 7: 298, 293-302. 
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participant, his treating physician may have a stake in the research and may present a more positive 
risk-to-benefit analysis than if he had no interest.  Subpart D should explicitly circumscribe fees 
given to physicians for child subject referrals and should at a minimum obligate full disclosure of 
the researcher’s conflicts of interest.  
C. Ineffective Oversight 
Despite a number of federal agencies which exist to oversee, punish and prevent the abuse 
of research subjects - OHRP, GAO, the Office of the Inspector General of DHHS - in addition to 
the role played by the National Bioethics Advisory Committee and the Institute of Medicine, the 
agencies have all reported “systemic weakness and ethical violations in the conduct of human 
research.”15 Between 1999 and 2000 alone, OHRP found twenty universities to be in substantial 
violation of the federal regulations governing human research subjects.16 Subpart D should include 
a regulation setting out consistent, thorough oversight of research on children, which would help 
deter their misuse and abuse in experiments. 
Child Assent/Parental Permission 
A. Child Assent 
Amongst the most significant deficiencies of Subpart D is the ambiguous, ill-conceived 
child assent/parental permission provision. Justice Cardozo enunciated the well-established right of 
every individual to the possession and control of his own body in 1914, declaring, “every human 
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body.” 17 But because children can not “consent” in the legal sense – a term that implies full 
competence to make an independent, legally-binding decision for one’s self – the regulations call 
for a proxy system in which a child gives “assent,” an affirmative agreement to partake in research, 
                                                 
15 Sharav, at 2 
16 Furrow, Johnson, Jost & Schwartz, Health Law: Cases, Materials & Problems, 5th Edition, 1529, 2004. 
17 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 at 129. 
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and a parent/parents give “permission” for the child to participate. One problem is that Subpart D 
does not define an age at which child assent should be solicited. Within each of the types of 
permissible research, §§ 404-407, Subpart D states that, “…adequate provisions are made for 
soliciting the assent of the children and permission of their parents or guardians, as set forth in 
§46.408.” The wording is problematic because it indicates that the process of attaining 
assent/permission may be more important than the actual procurement of assent/permission itself. 
Conceivably, if the assent/permission procedure exists and is initiated, research can proceed without 
its completion.  
 Further, the regulations make clear that the decision of when to solicit child assent is left to 
the IRB’s discretion. §46.408(a) states, 
In determining whether children are capable of assenting, the IRB shall take into 
account the ages, maturity, and psychological state of the children involved. This 
judgment may be made for all children to be involved in research under a particular 
protocol, or for each child, as the IRB deems appropriate. (emphasis added). 
 
Not only does the individual IRB determine when and if the child’s assent should be solicited, but 
the regulations specifically allow the IRB to waive the child’s assent depending on the child’s 
understanding, the benefit to the child, and an even broader, nebulous blanket waiver.  
§46.408(a) states,  
If the IRB determines that the capability of some or all of the children is so limited 
that they cannot reasonably be consulted or that the intervention or procedure 
involved in the research holds out a prospect of direct benefit that is important to the 
health or well-being of the children and is available only in the context of the 
research, the assent of the children is not a necessary condition for proceeding with 
the research. Even where the IRB determines that the subjects are capable of 
assenting, the IRB may still waive the assent requirement under circumstances in 
which consent may be waived in accord with §46.116 of Subpart A. (emphasis 
added). 
Subpart A allows for a waiver of consent in numerous situations: (1) if the research involves no 
more than minimal risk to the subjects; (2) the waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the 
rights and welfare of the subjects; (3) the research could not practicably be carried out without the 
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waiver or alteration; (4) and whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional 
pertinent information after participation. Several of those exceptions have disturbing implications 
for research subjects. For instance, the decision of when the waiver will not adversely affect the 
subject’s rights or welfare could vary vastly amongst IRBs.. Some could consider any waiver of 
consent to adversely affect one’s rights and some could consider that a waiver of consent in a 
nontherapeutic experiment would not adversely affect one’s rights in light of the potential to gain 
knowledge useful for others. The exception that allows waiver because research could not 
practicably be carried out without it seems to permit any research to proceed without consent, 
prioritizing the quest for knowledge above protecting subjects. Lastly, how does permitting waiver 
of consent but providing additional pertinent information after participation serve to protect the 
research subject?    
 With such broad latitude to decide when assent should or should not be solicited and heeded 
when it is solicited, the IRB has absolute discretion to disregard and override the child’s willingness 
to participate in research. This dangerous power is in direct contradiction to the supposed 
“additional protection” offered to children in Subpart D. 
 B. Parental Permission 
 
 As for the role of the parent or parents in giving permission, the effectiveness of the 
regulations in protecting child research subjects is questionable because the parents’ interests can 
conflict with the child’s, the parents may be under-informed or coerced into a decision, there is the 
possibility that the court may limit parental authority because their permission for participation goes 
against the child’s best interest, and the level of parental permission, one or both, may serve as an 
obstacle to participation as opposed to a protective mechanism.   
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In general, parents are authorized to make medical decisions for their children because it is 
believed that parents will do so in the child’s best interest.18 A parent’s permission for his child to 
participate in an experimental research protocol is necessarily different than his permission for an 
established medical treatment because of the less-established risk-to-benefit ratio of research in 
comparison to treatment. However, if a research protocol is the only treatment option for a child and 
it holds out the prospect of direct benefit, it is clear that participation, even in the face of unknown 
risk, could be in the child’s best interest.  But, in the case of a nontherapeutic experiment that holds 
out no benefit for the participating child, how can a parent’s permission be sufficient since 
participation clearly does not fall under the rubric of a child’s best interest? 
 There are numerous scenarios in which a child and parent’s interests can conflict and in 
which the parents do not act in accordance with the standard of the child’s best interest. Examples 
which the court has reviewed and noted as contrary to the child’s best interest include: the case of a 
seven-year-old girl with no evidence of a mental disorder whose parents hospitalized her in a 
psychiatric ward because of their disapproval of her older boyfriend; parents who overmedicate 
children because of their difficult behavior; parents who make “wrong” treatment decisions because 
of financial, emotional, marital or family interests which conflict with the child’s best interest.19 
One can perhaps more readily sympathize with a parent’s inability to focus on a child’s best interest 
because of emotional, marital and family stress than because of financial interests. But, since 
financial inducements are a factor that convince doctors to recommend child participation and 
children to act as participants, inducements are certainly a factor for some parents who permit their 
children to participate in research.  Payments may lead parents to underestimate risks in order to 
                                                 
18 Parham v. J.R., 422 U.S. 584, 602-603 (1979).  
19 Efi Rubenstein, Going Beyond Parents and Institutional Review Boards in Protecting Children Involved in 
Nontherapeutic Research, 33 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 251, 257-258, (Spring 2003). 
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gain monetary benefit, and may even cause them to ignore risks that develop once the child is in the 
protocol so that they can continue to make money.20
 A situation in which there is often a glaring conflict of interest between the parent and the 
child is with organ or bone marrow donation from one child to a sibling. Although being a donor is 
not akin to being a research subject, it is useful to consider the parent’s authority in giving this 
permission in comparison to a parent’s role in giving permission for a child to participate in 
nontherapeutic research.  In the case that parents want child A to donate bone marrow or an organ to 
another child in the family, child B, the parents are acting in the best interest of child B. The donor, 
child A, will not receive a physical benefit, although some posit a psychological, altruistic benefit.21 
Rather, the donor will undergo an invasive, potentially risky procedure that may be rationalized 
because there is a high likelihood of direct benefit to child B. However, when parents give 
permission for their child to act as a research participant in a protocol with no direct benefit but 
which may help gain knowledge about the child’s condition or a condition which the child does not 
have but which affects other children, the potential beneficiary is an unknown, future entity. 
 In Curran v. Bosze, 141 Ill.2d 473, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (1990), the Illinois Supreme Court 
denied a father’s petition to compel his three and one-half year old twins to submit to bone marrow 
harvesting for the benefit of their half brother who suffered from leukemia.  The court explained 
that a parent could only consent in such a case when to do so would be in the minor’s best interest. 
The factors the court considered were: if the parent was informed of the risks and benefits to the 
child; if there was emotional support to the child from the parents; and if there was an existing, 
close relationship between the donor and the recipient. Although one of the factors which weighed 
against allowing the father’s consent was that the mother objected to the procedure and would not 
                                                 
20 David Endler, et. al,. The Ethics of Paying for Children’s Participation in Research, 141 J. Pediatrics 166 – 169 
(2002).  
21 Rosalind Ekman Ladd, The Child as Living Donor: Parental Consent and Child Assent, 13 Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics 146, 143-148 (2004) (stating that we have no definitive understanding of the psychosocial response of 
well children to their siblings with chronic illness). 
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be supportive to the twins, the case largely hinged on the fact that the twins and their half sibling 
did not have a relationship with each other. Because of the lack of a relationship, the court reasoned 
that even though the half brother would likely die, the invasive procedure was not in the best 
interest of the twins. 
 While Subpart D sets out the parameters of nontherapeutic child research, in light of Curran, 
it is difficult to imagine a court upholding a parent’s authority to consent to any nontherapeutic 
research of their child as being in the child’s best interest when there is no relationship, let alone a 
close one, with the purported recipient of the research subject’s goodwill. As written by the 
Supreme Court, 
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are 
free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have 
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for 
themselves 22  
 
 Although the regulations, at § 46.116, require consent forms to be presented in language 
understandable to the potential participant, numerous studies indicate that the readability of the 
forms may be too advanced for the average research participant and that this may adversely affect a 
parent’s ability to grant permission. One study demonstrated that consent forms of hospitals 
required an undergraduate or graduate reading level.23Another study revealed that informed consent 
forms for pediatric biomedical research were written for a graduate student reading level.24 Given 
the weight of a parent’s permission to allow a child to participate as a research subject and their 
intended role as protector of the child’s best interest, consent forms need to be easily 
comprehensible and elucidate the risks, not obscure them. Further, because data indicates that 
                                                 
22 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170, 64 S.Ct. 438, 444, 88 L.Ed. 645. 
23 T.M. Grundner, On the Readability of Surgical Consent Forms, 302 N.Eng. J. Med at 901.  
24 Kenneth J. Tarnowski, et. al., Readability of Pediatric Biomedical Research Informed Consent Forms, 85 Pediatrics 
59-60. 
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parents who give permission for their children to participate as research subjects may be less 
educated, parental permission is not always the protective mechanism it was intended to be.25
 Although the Supreme Court has not decided a case indicating whether it would overrule a 
parent’s ability to give permission for his child’s participation as a research subject, two state court 
cases indicate that courts are willing to limit the authority of parents to allow their children to 
participate in nontherapeutic research. In a 1996 New York case, patients who were involuntarily 
hospitalized at psychiatric facilities and had been adjudicated mentally incapable of giving or 
withholding consent to participating in medical research brought an action challenging the Office of 
Mental Health (OMH) regulations governing research.26 On appeal, the New York Supreme Court 
held that OHM did not have authority to promulgate regulations governing human research and that 
the regulations violated due process. For purposes of child research, the court found the OMH 
regulations allowing the minor’s parent or legal guardian to consent to the child’s participation in 
greater than minimal risk nontherapeutic research invalid.  The court explained,  
We are not dealing here with parental choice among reasonable treatment 
alternatives, but with a decision to subject the child to nontherapeutic treatments and 
procedures that may cause harmful permanent or fatal side effects. It follows 
therefore that a parent or guardian, let alone another adult who may be a member of 
the child’s family, may not consent to have a child submit to painful and/or 
potentially life-threatening research procedure that hold no prospect of benefit for the 
child and that may have the same result as a denial of necessary treatment.27  
 
More recently, in the now infamous lead paint abatement research conducted by the Kennedy 
Krieger Institute, in 2001 the Maryland Supreme Court held that a parent or other legal guardian 
cannot consent to a child’s participation in nontherapeutic research that posed any risk (the court 
clarified “any risk” in stating that, “…the context of the statement was a nontherapeutic study that 
                                                 
25 Efi Rubinstein at 283 (citing S.C. Harth, R.R. Johnstone, & Y.H. Thong, The Psychological Profile of Parents Who 
Volunteer their Children for Clinical Research: A Controlled Study, 18 J. Med. Ethics 86, 90 (1992). 
26 T.D. v. New York Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173. 
27 Id. at 192. 
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promises no medical benefit to the child whatsoever, so that any balance between risk and benefit is 
necessarily negative.”) of injury to the child. 28 The opinion states, 
Whatever the interests of a parent, and whatever the interests of the general public in 
fostering research that might, according to a researcher’s hypothesis, be for the good 
of all children, this Court’s concern for the particular child and particular case, over-
arches all other interests. It is, simply, and we hope, succinctly put, not in the best 
interest of any healthy child to be intentionally put in a nontherapeutic situation 
where his or her health may be impaired, in order to test methods that may 
ultimately benefit all children.29 (emphasis added). 
 
While these New York and Maryland cases are not binding on other states, they suggest that 
parental permission alone is insufficient to safeguard a child’s vulnerability as a research subject 
and will not immunize research from court intervention on behalf of a child’s best interest. 
 Lastly in regard to parental permission, the regulations are inadequate in protecting children 
as research subjects in varying the level of parental permission in accord with the risk-to-benefit 
ratio of the proposed research. As will be discussed below, § 404, which presents no greater than 
minimal risk to the child subject and § 405, which involves greater than minimal risk but presents 
the prospect of direct benefit to the child, require the permission of only one parent. But § 406, in 
which research involves greater than minimal risk and no prospect of direct benefit to the child, but 
is likely to yield generalizable knowledge about the subject’s disorder or condition, and § 407, 
which has no limit on the level of risk and no direct benefit to the child subject but presents an 
opportunity to understand, prevent, or alleviate a serious problem affecting the health or welfare of 
children, require the permission of both parents. It is unclear that more than one parent’s input 
translates to more protection for child research subjects. In some families one parent is the primary 
decision-maker and requiring permission of the other parent may be little more than an obstacle as 
opposed to an additional safeguard. Further, since more than half of American children spend time 
in a single-family home whether because their biological parents never intended to live together, 
                                                 
28 Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001). 
29 Id. at 853. 
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one died, or they got divorced, requiring both parents to give permission may intrude upon the 
autonomy of the primary caregiver and may interfere with the family’s privacy.30
The Specific Risk Designations: §§ 404-407 
As for §§ 404-407, there are numerous grave problems with these designations. The “no 
greater than minimal risk” section, § 404, is the most lenient of the regulations. The study can 
proceed so long as it presents no greater than minimal risk and the IRB finds adequate provisions 
for soliciting child assent and a parent’s permission. Because the definition of minimal risk is broad 
and subjective, it can be manipulated at the expense of the child. Subpart D does not define minimal 
risk. Rather the National Commission’s report defines minimal risk as:  
The probability and magnitude of physical and psychological harm that is normally 
encountered in the daily lives, or in the routine medical or psychological 
examination, of healthy children.  
 
This definition does not sufficiently delimit permissible risk because the amount of risk a child may 
encounter in his daily life or in a routine examination can vary widely. For instance, if a child is 
exposed to a grave risk of violence, disease, and psychological harm in his daily life, should the 
IRB take that into account in determining minimal risk? Is it conscionable for an IRB to determine 
that a great risk to an “overprotected” child would be a minimal, permissible risk, for one 
accustomed to daily dangers?  
A telling example of an IRB’s elastic interpretation of minimal risk comes from an obesity 
experiment in which 100 obese and 92 normal weight children ages 6 to 10, endured a two-day 
overnight hospital stay and were subjected to, 
Insertion of an intravenous line for 18 hours; a battery of intensive measurements of 
metabolic rates; a two-hour hyperglycemic claim study involving a second IV line 
for two hours; blood sampling at five minute intervals; a three-hour hyperinsulemic 
                                                 
30 Lanie Friedman Ross, Informed Consent in Pediatric Research, 13 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 348-
349 (2004). 
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clamp study for two hours with two IV lines; and infusion of glucose and insulin for 
two hours.31
 
The experiment was investigated by OHRP and later suspended. The IRB justified its 
unanimous approval of this “minimal risk” research in stating,  
Several members of the committee explored the meaning of minimal risk and what a 
child might encounter in a visit to the doctor or while playing in traffic.  It was felt 
that spending several hours in the clinical center in a clamp experiment would be 
safer than playing actively on sidewalks and streets.32(emphasis added) 
 
As that explanation demonstrates, the IRB can infuse their highly imaginative concept of the 
child’s daily experience with lurking dangers in order to justify the risk level of a proposed 
experiment.  
Further, § 404 permits any research, so long as the risk is within this “low” level.  But as 
mentioned earlier, is it ethical to subject the child participant to even a minimal risk - is it in his best 
interest - if the research presents no direct benefit to him? In the above-mentioned obesity 
experiment, should 92 normal weight children have been poked, prodded, clamped and monitored 
for two days, enduring great discomfort if not lasting harm, solely to function as a control group? 
For a sick child, is even a minimal risk too much if the research has no prospect of direct 
therapeutic effect or even a promise to glean information concerning his condition? 
 The “Greater than minimal risk, but direct benefit” category, § 405, raises numerous issues. 
Preeminent amongst them: is there a limit to acceptable risk? How much greater can “greater than 
minimal” risk be? It appears that extremely risky pediatric research could be justified so long as 
existing treatments are ineffective and the potential benefit, even though unlikely, would be positive 
if it did actually occur. Although any medical procedure entails a risk-to-benefit analysis, in the 
context of research, since the experiment serves numerous interests - those of the funding company, 
                                                 
31 Protecting Children in Clinical Drug Trials, Med. Ethics Adv, 3-4 (January 1, 2004). 
32 Id. at 4 
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the researcher, and perhaps the institution itself - there is real opportunity for the IRB to 
underestimate risk and overstate a potential benefit.  
 Moreover, § 405 requires only one parent’s permission. If having permission from both 
parents does indeed protect the child, as it is intended to do, then because the level of risk in  
§ 405 is not circumscribed as it is in § 406, which only allows a “minor increase over minimal risk,” 
how is the child protected when in the former only one parent need give permission and in the later 
both must give permission? 
Under § 406, although the research will not have a therapeutic benefit for the participant, 
because the risk is circumscribed, the research is permitted in the hopes of gaining knowledge about 
the participant’s condition.  Aside from the dangers of allowing those who cannot give informed 
consent to serve a Utilitarian role, the problem with this section is that the level of permissible risk 
is vague and may be too high.  § 406(a) limits the risk level to “a minor increase over minimal.”  
This adds another level of ambiguity to the already subjective designation of minimal risk in § 404.  
How does one quantify “minor increase?”  
Another issue in § 406 is the broad list of experiences to which the experiment should be 
commensurate. It states,  
The intervention or procedure presents experiences to subjects that are reasonably 
commensurate with those inherent in their actual or expected medical, dental, 
psychological, social, or educational situations. 
 
But using familiarity to delineate risk level is of little assistance because there is such a range of 
personal experiences and levels of pain and risk within these perhaps “normal” situations. For 
instance, the IRB could imagine a scenarios in which a child who is presently not getting adequate 
dental care will in the future endure painful tooth extractions and develop gum disease.  The IRB 
could rationalize that the extractions and the gum disease will be very risky because of the risk of 
infection and increased incidence of heart disease. They could then decide that a proposed 
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experiment’s risk level is within the acceptable range, “a minor increase over minimal,” because it 
is commensurate with this imagined future scenario. 
Additionally, even though the section states that the research involves no prospect of direct 
benefit to individual subjects, (c) states that it is,  
… likely to yield generalizable knowledge about the subjects’ disorder or condition 
which is of vital importance for the understanding or amelioration of the subjects’ 
disorder or condition. (emphasis added)  
 
The wording is deceptive, suggesting that the generalizable knowledge will be directly applicable to 
the subject himself. To more accurately reflect the selfless, utilitarian purpose of § 406 research, the 
regulation should read, “…likely to yield generalizable knowledge…for the understanding or 
amelioration of a disorder or condition, which may in the future benefit those with the condition or 
disorder.” Again, there is the overarching question of whether we want children to act for the utility 
of others, especially since here the participant already has a disease or condition. 
The last-resort section, 407, is the most perilous of Subpart D research categories, reserved for 
“research not otherwise approvable.” Although the drafters have added additional procedural 
hurdles for granting research approval, almost any conceivable experiment could be rationalized so 
long as the inquiry applies to “a serious problem affecting the health or welfare of children.”  The 
opportunity for abuse is immense and the rationale, an unbridled research imperative, is 
questionable. Whereas sections 404-406 attempt to (unsuccessfully) delineate a permissible risk 
level, this section contains no limit on the level of risk. The United States stands alone in allowing 
this type of research – no limit on risk and no prospect of direct benefit for the participant.33        
                                                 
33 Loretta Kopelman and Timothy Murphy, Ethical Concerns about Federal Approval of Risky Pediatric Studies, 
Pediatrics 1783 (June 1, 2004). 
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Although § 407 has existed for over two decades, only a few reviews have been 
completed.34 Historically, this high risk/low personal benefit section was designed in light of the 
polio epidemic of the 1950s and 1960s. One of the Commissioners who participated in the National 
Commission report stated that although the general policy objective was to protect children, the 
Commissioners rationalized that a great threat, such as polio, might sometimes justify higher 
risks.35 But since the regulation is so ambiguous, while it may be useful to combat a serious threat, 
it would also allow for non-urgent, ethically suspect research. 
One obvious issue with § 407 is that there is no definition of a “serious problem affecting 
the health or welfare of children.”  How many children must it affect? Would a deathly illness that 
affects only a miniscule percentage of children qualify? Would a painful, fatal disease that afflicts 
only ten in one million, five to ten year-old girls with both parents of Chinese origin justify § 407 
approval? Another pitfall is the inclusion of the term “welfare” in addition to “health.”  Almost 
anything could be said to affect the health and welfare of children.  Where are the limits? Could 
social issues, for instance a proclivity to violence or coming under the influence of peer pressure, be 
investigated under § 407 under the rubric of understanding, preventing, or alleviating a serious 
problem affecting the welfare of children? Additionally, the regulation does not differentiate 
between sick or healthy participants. It falls to the individual IRB and the panel of experts to apply 
their morals to this unwieldy question.  
 Perhaps most importantly, while the section mandates increased procedures to attain 
approval, the procedures have no teeth. Whereas §§ 404-406 only require IRB approval, §407 
requires both IRB approval and that the Secretary of DHHS give approval after consulting with a 
panel of experts and allowing for public review and comment. The regulation does set out examples 
of the fields of experts to be consulted – science, medicine, education, ethics, and law.  But just as 
                                                 
34 Id  
35 Id.  
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an IRB’s approval is shaped by its membership, so too would a panel of experts’ decision.  The 
regulations do not specify that there be any particular number or mixture of experts. One can 
imagine that an expert panel of all scientists, or all corporate attorneys would not be an asset in 
deciding an essentially moral issue: when should a child be allowed to participate in an unlimited 
risk study that will have no personal benefit whatsoever?  Additionally, if the composition of 
experts changes with each review, there will be no consistency in deciding what is approvable. 
 As for the public review and comment provision, it is a weak addition. Probably only those 
directly involved with the proposed research will know to read the Federal Register to participate in 
the review and comment; the general public will be largely unaware. Further, the regulations do not 
elaborate on what is to be disclosed for review, how thorough a revelation of risk is required, or for 
how long. In sum, these procedural approval additions are little more than cosmetic. 
Suggestions 
While Congressional efforts to spur on pediatric research were well intended in light of the 
paucity of pediatric pharmaceutical information, the surge in pediatric research under the current 
ambiguous and elastic Subpart D regulations is cause for concern.  We should redraft Subpart D to: 
better define and limit the permissible levels of risk; necessitate that approval review is more 
standardized amongst IRBs;  mandate that IRBs include child specialists;  include child advocates 
who will participate in the assent/permission solicitation and help ensure the exposure of conflicts 
of interest and a realistic presentation of risks and benefits; eliminate waiver of a child’s assent and 
require child assent in any research so long as the child is competent; ensure that parental 
permission is in line with a child’s best interest - in other words, only permit parental permission for 
research which has the prospect of direct benefit to the child or if not, only presents a truly minimal 
risk; prevent inducements to doctors, parents and children; and eliminate § 407 altogether except in 
the case of grave public health emergencies that would affect 25% or more of children.  
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